A Historical Overview of the Regulation of Market Abuse in South Africa by Chitimira, Howard
   
 
ISSN 1727-3781 
 
Author: H Chitimira 
 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF MARKET 
ABUSE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v17i3.03 
2014 VOLUME 17 No 3 
H CHITIMIRA  PER / PELJ 2014(17)3 
937 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE IN 
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1  Introduction  
The consequences of market abuse have been felt in a number of jurisdictions 
globally,1 including in South Africa.2 Its reputation for high levels of market abuse 
practices associated with the South African financial markets in the mid 1990s is a 
case in point.3 In an early attempt to combat market abuse practices in the South 
African financial markets, legislation such as the Companies Act,4 the Financial 
Markets Control Act5 and the Stock Exchanges Control Act6 were enacted. However, 
these Acts failed to effectively curb market abuse activities that were allegedly rife in 
the financial markets.7 Consequently, in 1995 the Ministry of Finance appointed "The 
King Task Group into the Insider Trading Legislation",8 which recommended further 
reforms of insider trading and other related laws.9 The Insider Trading Act10 was 
enacted and came into effect on 17 January 1999. 
While the introduction of the Insider Trading Act brought some confidence in the 
financial markets, market abuse activities were still not extinguished. Its provisions 
                                        
  Howard Chitimira. LLB LLM (UFH), LLD (NMMU). Lecturer, Faculty of Law, North-West University 
(Mafikeng Campus). E-mail: Howard.Chitimira@nwu.ac.za. This article was influenced in part by 
Chitimira's doctoral thesis entitled A Comparative Analysis of the Enforcement of Market Abuse 
Provisions 27-50. In this regard, he wishes to acknowledge the expert input of Professor VA 
Lawack.  
1  Myburgh and Davis 2004 http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf 8; generally 
see related comments by Bhattacharya and Daouk Date Unknown 
http://www.faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~charvey/Teaching/BA453_2004/BD_The_world.pdf; Van 
Deventer 2008 http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/ FSBReport.pdf 1-5. 
2  Van Deventer 2008 http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf 1-4; Myburgh and 
Davis 2004 http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/ FSBReport.pdf 8-13. 
3  Myburgh and Davis 2004 http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf 11. 
4  Companies Act 61 of 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act; see ss 162, 229-233.  
5  Financial Markets Control Act 55 of 1989, hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Control 
Act; see ss 20-23.  
6  Stock Exchanges Control Act 1 of 1985, hereinafter referred to as the Stock Exchanges Control 
Act; see s 40.  
7  Myburgh and Davis 2004 http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf 11. 
8  Hereinafter referred to as the "King Task Group" and its report as the “King Report". 
9  The King Task Group published its first draft report on 15 May 1997 and the final report on 21 
October 1997. 
10  Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998; hereinafter referred to as the Insider Trading Act.  
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were rather inadequate and ineffectively implemented.11 A number of factors 
contributed to the enactment of the flawed provisions, and the ineffective 
enforcement.12 They included inadequate resources, inadequate sanctions and the 
inherently difficult nature of investigating and prosecuting cases of market abuse.13 
The Securities Services Act14 was therefore enacted to repeal and replace all the 
flawed provisions of the Insider Trading Act and improve the regulation and 
enforcement of the ban on market abuse. Three major forms of market abuse, 
namely insider trading, prohibited trading practices (trade-based market 
manipulation) and the publication of false, misleading or deceptive statements 
relating to listed companies (disclosure-based market manipulation) were 
prohibited.15 
Although the enactment of the Insider Trading Act and the Securities Services Act 
could be seen as valuable attempts on the part of the South African legislature to 
improve the general regulation of market abuse, more may still need to be done to 
increase the number of convictions and settlements in cases involving market abuse 
in South Africa. It is against this background that a historical overview analysis of 
the regulation of market abuse is carried out in this article to expose the flaws that 
were previously embedded in the South African market abuse laws prior to 2004. 
This is done to raise awareness of the situation among the relevant stakeholders as 
they consider whether such flaws were adequately resolved or subsequently re-
introduced under the Securities Services Act and the Financial Markets Act. To this 
end the article firstly discusses the historical development and regulation of market 
                                        
11  Osode 2000 J Afr L 239.  
12  Jooste 2006 SALJ 441-460; Jooste 2000 SALJ 284-305; Osode 2000 J Afr L 239; Van Deventer 
1999 FSB Bulletin 3; the King Task Group Minority Report para 3.4 as summarised in Beuthin and 
Luiz Basic Company Law 235-238; also see generally Chitimira Regulation of Insider Trading 41-
72.  
13  Jooste 2006 SALJ 441-460; Beuthin and Luiz Basic Company Law 235-238; Osode 2000 J Afr L 
239.  
14  Securities Services Act 36 of 2004, hereinafter referred to as the Securities Services Act, which 
came into effect on 1 February 2005.  
15  Ss 73; 75; 76 and 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 82; 84; 85; 86 and 87 of the 
Draft Financial Markets Bill, 2011, hereinafter referred to as the Draft Financial Markets Bill; 
clauses 80; 82; 83 and 84 of the Financial Markets Bill [B12-2012], hereinafter referred to as the 
Financial Markets Bill, 2012 (I have employed the term "clause" to refer to the provisions of both 
the Draft Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill, 2012) and ss 78; 80; 81 and 82 of 
the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012, hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Act, which 
came into effect on 03 June 2013.  
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manipulation prior to 2004. Secondly, the regulation and enforcement of insider 
trading legislation prior to 2004 is examined. Moreover, where possible, certain flaws 
of the previous market abuse laws that were re-incorporated into the current South 
African market abuse legislation are isolated and recommendations are made in this 
regard.16 
2  The regulation of market manipulation prior to 2004 
In order to establish the historical background of the enforcement of the market 
manipulation ban in South Africa, a closer look at previous legislation that dealt with 
market abuse is necessary.17 This is done by briefly examining the regulation of 
market manipulation under the Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial 
Markets Control Act.  
2.1  The regulation of market manipulation in terms of the Stock 
Exchanges Control Act 1 of 1985 
Two forms of market abuse, namely trade-based market manipulation and 
disclosure-based market manipulation relating to listed securities were prohibited in 
terms of the Stock Exchanges Control Act.18 The responsibility for enforcement was 
placed upon the Johannesburg Stock Exchange itself, and on the courts.19 The 
delayed publication of price-sensitive information relating to listed securities was 
arguably the most common form of disclosure-based market manipulation in South 
Africa.20 The publication of ambiguous information, tip-offs (tipping) and rumours 
also created another challenge for the enforcement authorities.21  
                                        
16  In spite of the paucity of convictions and settlements in civil and criminal cases involving market 
abuse, the legislature has managed to raise the standards of practice in South African financial 
markets up to a level that would make them comparable with the highest standards of similar 
markets in the developed world and international best practice, by enacting some definitions as 
well as civil and administrative sanctions against market abuse.  
17  It should be borne in mind that prior to 2004 insider trading was regulated separately under the 
Companies Act and later under the Insider Trading Act, while market manipulation was outlawed 
in the Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act.  
18  S 40 of the Stock Exchanges Control Act. 
19  Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 159.  
20  Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 159. 
21  A few prosecutions especially in market manipulation cases involving option and term contracts 
share transactions were successfully concluded under the Stock Exchanges Control Act.  
H CHITIMIRA  PER / PELJ 2014(17)3 
940 
2.2  The regulation of market manipulation in terms of the Financial 
Markets Control Act 55 of 1989 
The enactment of the Financial Markets Control Act was aimed, among other things, 
at curbing market manipulative practices that were allegedly common in option and 
term contracts transactions.22 Two forms of market abuse, namely trade-based 
market manipulation and disclosure-based market manipulation relating to listed 
securities were prohibited under the Financial Markets Control Act.23 Furthermore, 
the Financial Markets Control Act prohibited the dissemination or making of 
statements which a person knew or ought reasonably to have known were likely to 
induce other persons to deal in financial instruments or have the effect of altering 
the price for dealing in financial instruments.24 The Financial Markets Control Act 
prohibited the publication or non-publication of information which had the effect of 
inducing another person to deal in a financial instrument on a financial market.25 This 
was further complemented by the Companies Act, which prohibited the 
dissemination of false information in a prospectus.26 
Where the contravention of the relevant provisions of the Financial Markets Control 
Act caused another person to be prejudiced, a statutory action for damages was 
provided for under the same Act.27 For example, damages were calculated by looking 
at the difference between the price at which the dealing took place and the price at 
which it would be likely to have taken place if the contravention had not occurred.28 
Claimants were not required to prove that the price had been altered by the 
offender's misrepresentation or market manipulation.29 The Financial Markets Control 
Act further stipulated that prejudiced persons might claim twice the profit gained or 
likely to be gained or the loss avoided from the contravention of its market abuse 
                                        
22  Ss 20-23 of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
23  S 20 of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
24  See s 21 of the Financial Markets Control Act. Also see Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 158. 
25  S 22 of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
26  See s 162 of the Companies Act. Also see Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 159. 
27  Ss 20-23 of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
28  S 23(2) of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
29  S 23(2) and (3) of the Financial Markets Control Act. Also see generally Henning and Du Toit 
2000 JJS 160.  
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provisions.30 Prejudiced persons had two years to institute a claim against any 
person who violated the relevant provisions of the Financial Markets Control Act.31 In 
addition, the Registrar of Financial Institutions had the responsibility of instituting 
claims on behalf of all the prejudiced persons.32 In order to get compensation in such 
instances, the burden of proof was on the claimant to prove that the loss he had 
suffered was caused by the offender's market manipulative actions.33 
2.3  Evaluation of the enforcement of the market manipulation 
prohibition under the Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial 
Markets Control Act  
Both the Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act had little 
success in combating market manipulation in South Africa.34 A minimum number of 
settlements and prosecutions were achieved in civil and criminal cases involving 
market manipulation and other market abuse activities in South Africa prior to 
2004.35 The paucity of successful settlements and prosecutions of market 
manipulation cases was allegedly caused by the failure on the part of the South 
African legislature to enact a more appropriate anti-market abuse enforcement 
framework.36 Notably, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange's enforcement responsibility 
was not clearly defined, especially in the Stock Exchanges Control Act. The Stock 
Exchanges Control Act stated only that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange had the 
responsibility of policing market manipulation provisions without expressly and 
clearly defining its powers and functions.37 Furthermore, it is unclear whether the 
Directorate of Public Prosecutions or the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was solely 
responsible for the prosecution of market manipulation cases in South Africa.38 While 
it may be assumed that the Directorate of Public Prosecutions was responsible for 
                                        
30  S 23(3) of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
31  S 23(4) of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
32  See s 23(5) of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
33  Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 158-160, for further analysis and related comments. 
34  Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 158-160. 
35  Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 158-160. 
36  Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 158-160, for further analysis and related comments. 
37  Also see Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 159; Van Zyl 1992 Transactions of the Center for 
Business Law 231. 
38  Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 159. 
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the prosecution of market manipulation cases, it is unclear whether the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange had similar prosecutorial powers, especially in 
criminal matters. This follows the fact that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was 
merely given the general powers to oversee the regulation and detection of the 
occurrence of market abuse activity in the regulated financial markets in South 
Africa.39 No express authority was statutorily conferred on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange itself to adjudicate and prosecute market manipulation cases in South 
Africa prior to 2004.40 This flaw remained unresolved in the Securities Services Act, 
the Draft Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and eventually, in 
the Financial Markets Act.41 
Although the penalties for committing market manipulation offences were not clearly 
stipulated in the Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act, 
such offences could possibly have led to considerably severe civil or criminal 
sanctions against offenders. Both the Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial 
Markets Control Act overlooked the express provision of administrative or civil 
monetary penalties, an imprisonment term or any other appropriate penalties that 
could have been imposed on unscrupulous persons who engaged in market 
manipulation practices in the South African financial markets prior to 2004.42 This 
ambiguity could have further contributed to the inconsistent enforcement of market 
manipulation provisions under the Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial 
Markets Control Act.43  
The Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act did not 
provide adequate measures and mechanisms for the effective detection, 
investigation, prosecution and prevention of market manipulation in the South 
African financial markets. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange was solely responsible 
for the detection of market manipulation activities in the South African financial 
                                        
39  Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 159, for related concerns and criticisms. 
40  Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS158-160, for further discussion. 
41  Ss 73; 75; 76 and 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 82; 84; 85; 86 and 87 of the 
Draft Financial Markets Bill; clauses 80; 82; 83 and 84 of the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and ss 
78; 80; 81 and 82 of the Financial Markets Act.  
42  Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 158-165, for related concerns and criticisms. 
43  Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 158-165, for similar comments. 
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markets.44 Other enforcement authorities like the courts and the Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions were probably less co-operative or not involved in the primary 
investigation, detection and prevention of market manipulation practices in the 
South African financial markets prior to 2004.45 Moreover, the Stock Exchanges 
Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act did not expressly provide for the 
establishment of a surveillance system and other methods such as arbitration and 
alternative dispute resolution, whistle-blowing and bounty rewards to enhance the 
detection and investigation of market manipulation in the financial markets. 
Likewise, other anti-market abuse measures such as whistle-blowing and bounty 
rewards were also not expressly provided in the Securities Services Act, the Draft 
Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and the Financial Markets 
Act.46 
It appears as if the market manipulation prohibition under the Stock Exchanges 
Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act did not have extra-territorial 
application.47 Furthermore, it is unclear whether or not there were any co-operation 
agreements between the South African enforcement authorities and similar 
authorities at an international level to combat cross-border market abuse activities 
prior to 2004.  
3  The regulation of insider trading prior to 2004 
The anti-insider trading regulatory and enforcement frameworks established under 
the Companies Act (including all its amendments)48 and the Insider Trading Act are 
examined below to explore how such frameworks were implemented. However, this 
section does not discuss all the provisions of these Acts in detail. The focus is on the 
provisions that dealt with the regulation and enforcement of the insider trading ban 
under the relevant statutes.  
                                        
44  Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 158-165.  
45  Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 158-165. 
46  Ss 73; 75; 76 and 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 82; 84; 85; 86 and 87 of the 
Draft Financial Markets Bill; clauses 80; 82; 83 and 84 of the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and ss 
78; 80; 81 and 82 of the Financial Markets Act.  
47  See s 40 of the Stock Exchanges Control Act; ss 20 to 23 of the Financial Markets Control Act.  
48  The Companies Act was amended by the Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989 and the Second 
Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990.  
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3.1  The regulation of insider trading in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 
1973 before its 1989 and 1990 amendments 
It is generally agreed that the regulation of insider trading was only introduced by 
the relevant provisions of the Companies Act.49 The enactment of these provisions 
was performed in accordance with the recommendations of the Van Wyk de Vries 
Commission of Inquiry into the Companies Act of 1973.50 The relevant provisions of 
the Companies Act are briefly outlined, with an emphasis on those that directly and 
expressly outlawed the practice of insider trading.51 Some of the provisions of the 
Companies Act were enacted to enhance the enforcement of its insider trading 
prohibition by precluding directors, officers and other employees from dealing in a 
company's shares before the inside information relating to such shares had been 
made public.52 Directors and certain officers were prohibited from dealing in the 
share and debenture options of the company or any associated company.53 
A number of definitions were introduced for the purpose of enforcing the insider 
trading and other related provisions of the Companies Act.54 The term "interest" was 
defined to include any right to subscribe for, or any right to any shares or 
debentures or any option in respect of shares or debentures, without derogating 
from the generality of the word. The term "officer" included any employee who 
would be in possession of any information consequent to his immediate relationship 
with the directors of the company immediately before the public announcement of 
that information under the general insider trading provision.55 The use of the phrase 
                                        
49  S 224, ss 229-233 of the Companies Act. Also see further Jooste 1991 BML 248; the 
Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Second Amendment Bill, 1990 [B119-90] (GA); 
Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 4. 
50  Hereinafter referred to as the "Van Wyk de Vries Commission" and its main report as the "Van 
Wyk de Vries Report". See the Van Wyk de Vries Report paras 44.49, 44.57. 
51  Ss 224, 229-232 will be briefly discussed while more emphasis will be focused on s 233 which 
generally provided for the regulation of insider trading in South Africa under the Companies Act. 
The analysis of all the provisions of the Companies Act is, however, beyond the scope of this 
article. 
52  Ss 224, ss 229-232 of the Companies Act which were enacted in a bid to improve the 
enforcement of the insider trading prohibition that was contained in s 233 of the Companies Act. 
Also see Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 5.  
53  See s 224 of the Companies Act. 
54  See further s 229 of the Companies Act which contained several definitions for the purposes of 
enforcing ss 230-233.  
55  S 233 of the Companies Act. 
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"includes" suggests that these definitions were not exhaustive.56 The definitions of 
"person" and "past director" respectively had the effect of extending the general 
insider trading provisions57 to persons according to whose instructions directors 
would normally act, and to past directors for a period of six months after they had 
ceased to be directors. "Shares and debentures of the company" included shares 
and debentures of companies in the same group. 
Every public company was required to keep a special register of the interests of 
directors and others in the shares and debentures of the company.58 Failure to 
comply with any of these provisions was a criminal offence.59 Directors, past 
directors, officers and certain persons were obliged to lodge with the company 
within a specified period a written notice regarding changes in any material interest 
in their shareholding in the company concerned.60 In other words, directors were 
required, as soon as they acquired knowledge of the non-public inside information, 
to determine forthwith by resolution the names of the officers taken to be in 
possession of that information.61 
Every director, past director, officer or any person who had knowledge of inside 
information concerning a transaction or proposed transaction or the affairs of the 
company, which, if it would become publicly known, could be expected to materially 
affect the price of the shares or debentures, would be guilty of an offence if he dealt 
in any way to his advantage, directly or indirectly, in such shares or debentures 
before the public announcement of such information on a stock exchange or in a 
newspaper or through medium of the radio or television.62 The Companies Act 
                                        
56  The term "interest" may for instance also cover the interest of beneficiaries under a trust to 
receive dividends or which a trustee, executor or guardian might have had in those capacities, in 
a company's shares. Likewise, the term "officer" was wider than the definition in s 1 of the 
Companies Act in the sense that it could include other employees who did not occupy executive 
positions. Also see Milne et al Henochsberg 404-405. 
57  Ss 230-233 of the Companies Act. 
58  S 230(1), (2) and (3) of the Companies Act. 
59  S 231(2) of the Companies Act; see further ss 230(4) and 232(3) of the same Act. 
60  S 232(1)(b) and (c) read with s 230(2) of the Companies Act. See also subsection (1)(a), that 
provided for particulars relating to non-public inside information at the time this Act came into 
operation. 
61  S 232(1)(d) and (2) of the Companies Act.  
62  See s 233 of the Companies Act.  
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specifically prohibited insider trading in relation to listed shares.63 Insider trading was 
simply treated as a criminal offence which could be committed by a director, officer 
or employee of the company or a person in accordance with whose instructions any 
director was accustomed to act.  
3.1.1  Evaluation of the enforcement of the insider trading prohibition under the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 before its 1989 and 1990 amendments 
The enforcement of the insider trading prohibition was probably a co-operative 
responsibility of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the Registrar of Companies 
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Trade and Industry, and the Department 
of Justice (the Attorney-General's Office).64 The Johannesburg Stock Exchange was 
primarily responsible for monitoring and detecting the occurrence of insider trading. 
It was further mandated to monitor all trading and request dealing returns from 
brokers when suspected insider trading activities were detected. In addition, it was 
required to submit such dealing returns to the Registrar of Companies when 
suspected insider trading activities were confirmed by the preliminary investigation.65 
The Registrar of Companies was responsible for further analysis of the relevant data 
and for referring such data to the Attorney-General's Office.  
In addition, the Attorney-General's Office was responsible for the prosecution of 
insider trading cases.66 However, no successful prosecutions of insider trading cases 
were brought under the Companies Act.67 This could have been caused in part by 
serious flaws that were embedded in its initial insider trading provisions.68 For 
example, key terms like "insider", "tippee" and "tipping" were not statutorily and 
expressly defined under the Companies Act. Moreover, proving that the accused was 
a person falling under one of the categories of insiders as was proscribed in the 
                                        
63  The term "insider trading" was used only in relation to securities listed on a regulated market 
and it applied only to directors or officers of a company. Moreover, the concept of "insider 
trading" was not defined under the Companies Act. See s 233.  
64  See generally ss 224; 230-233, 440-441of the Companies Act. Also see Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 
5-7. 
65  See further ss 224; 230-233, 440-441of the Companies Act. 
66  See further ss 230-233, 440-441of the Companies Act. Also see Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 5. 
67  The provisions of s 233 came into operation on 1 January 1974. Also see Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 
5-6. 
68  See ss 233, 441of the Companies Act. 
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Companies Act was difficult, and the onus was on the prosecution to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the person accused was aware of the fact that the information 
he possessed was non-public confidential information. This may have been 
extremely difficult to prove and could have impeded the successful prosecution of 
insider trading cases. Besides, the criminal penalties for insider trading69 were not 
sufficient to deter potential offenders, considering the enormous profits that an 
insider could make from such transactions.70 In the light of this, a provision for civil 
liability could have been an additional deterrent to potential offenders and a 
meaningful remedy to the victims of insider trading. Nonetheless, no provision was 
made for directors or other insiders to pay civil monetary fines or compensate 
shareholders if, for example, such shareholders had sold their shares to the 
directors, ignorant of the fact that they might suffer prejudice due to insider 
trading.71  
Professors Bhana and Botha submit that these shortcomings hindered the general 
enforcement, detection, investigation and prosecution of insider trading cases in 
South Africa, especially under the Companies Act.72 As a result, some unscrupulous 
directors and employees of companies could have enjoyed an unfair advantage over 
other persons who were denied the opportunity to compete fairly in the buying and 
selling of shares.73 
3.2  The regulation of insider trading in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 
1973 subsequent to the 1989 amendments 
The original insider trading provision had several flaws.74 As a result it was repealed 
and replaced by a new provision in terms of the Companies Amendment Act.75 A 
                                        
69  There were no civil penalties for insider trading. See s 441(1)(b) of the Companies Act.  
70  Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 5.  
71  See the related views and comments in Percival v Wright 1902 2 Ch 421, where it was argued 
inter alia that directors do not owe any common law fiduciary duties to individual shareholders; 
hence, such shareholders could not sue them for insider trading; Pretorius v Natal South Sea 
Investment Trust 1965 3 SA 410 (W) 417 for further discussion on the enforcement of the 
insider trading ban in South Africa prior to 2004. 
72  Bhana 1987 SAJBM 201; Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 6. 
73  Osode 1999 AJICL 694-695. 
74  See s 233 of the Companies Act. 
H CHITIMIRA  PER / PELJ 2014(17)3 
948 
chapter that dealt with the regulation of securities was added to the Companies 
Act.76 Section 440F formed part of this chapter and contained a prohibition of insider 
trading in very wide terms. A director, past director or any other person connected 
with a company who had knowledge of any information which, when published, was 
likely to affect the price of such securities, would be guilty of an offence if he would 
deal in such securities within 24 hours after the public announcement of that 
information on a stock exchange, or in a newspaper or television, or by other 
means.77 Thus, tippees would incur the same liability if they were to deal on the 
basis of the information received from any of the persons referred to in subsection 
(2)(a) at any time when the tipper was not allowed to deal.78  
Nevertheless, the insider trading provisions of the Companies Amendment Act79 in 
their original form repeated some of the flaws that have been discussed in relation 
to the initial insider trading prohibition contained in the Companies Act.80 It came 
under fire for having largely adopted American principles on insider trading without 
proper regard to the South African circumstances.81 
3.2.1  The purported enforcement framework for the insider trading prohibition 
under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 subsequent to the 1989 amendments 
The Companies Amendment Act introduced the Securities Regulation Panel as a 
regulatory body that was required to monitor and enforce the insider trading 
prohibition.82 The Securities Regulation Panel had the powers to police insider 
trading by supervising dealings in securities.83 It also had the powers to subpoena 
and interrogate any persons accused of insider trading.84 In addition, certain persons 
were required to disclose to is any information regarding their beneficial holding of 
                                                                                                                          
75  Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989, hereinafter referred to as the Companies Amendment 
Act. See s 6.  
76  Chapter XVA "Regulation of Securities".  
77  Also see s 440F(2)(a) of the Companies Amendment Act.  
78  See s 440F(2)(b) of the Companies Amendment Act.  
79  See the original s 440F of the Companies Amendment Act. 
80  See s 233 of the Companies Act. 
81  Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 7-11; also see generally Bhana 1987 SAJBM 201-202; Osode 1999 AJICL 
690-695.  
82  See s 440B of the Companies Amendment Act. 
83  See s 440C(1)(b) of the Companies Amendment Act. 
84  See s 440D of the Companies Amendment Act; also see further s 440C(6)(c) of the same Act.  
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securities.85 Put differently, the Securities Regulation Panel was inter alia entrusted 
with the main responsibility of monitoring and investigating insider trading activities 
in South Africa prior to 1998.86 This was clearly stated in the Memorandum on the 
Objects of the Companies Second Amendment Bill of 1989.87  
Moreover, the maximum sentence was considerably increased. Persons convicted of 
insider trading were liable to pay the relevant enforcement authorities a fine of R500 
000, or to be imprisoned for a period not exceeding ten years, or both. 
Notwithstanding the efforts on the part of the legislature to outlaw insider trading, 
the provisions of the Companies Amendment Act were still seriously flawed. As a 
result, the insider trading prohibition under the Companies Amendment Act never 
came into operation and will therefore not be discussed in detail. It was replaced by 
a new insider trading prohibition that was introduced in terms of the Second 
Companies Amendment Act.88 
3.3  The regulation of insider trading in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 
1973 subsequent to the 1990 amendments  
Due to fears that the insider trading ban under the Companies Amendment Act was 
not good enough, the Second Companies Amendment Act extensively revised the 
provisions that dealt with insider trading and introduced a number of innovations.89 
The prohibition on insider trading was expressly made applicable to all dealings in 
securities. The term "securities" was defined to include company shares as well as 
stock debentures convertible into shares and any rights or interests in a company or 
rights or interests in respect of any such shares, stock or debentures including any 
financial instruments as defined in the Financial Markets Control Act.90 This definition 
was still limited to securities in a company or financial instruments as stated.91 
                                        
85  See s 440G of the Companies Amendment Act. 
86  Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 7; also see further Osode 1999 AJICL 690-695.  
87  Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Second Amendment Bill, 1989 [B99-89] (GA). 
88  Second Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Second Companies 
Amendment Act; see the revised s 440F.  
89  See the revised s 440F. 
90  See the definition of "security" in s 440A(1) of the Second Companies Amendment Act. 
91  The term "company" in this context entailed entities registered or recognised in terms of the 
Companies Act. See ss 1-3 of the Companies Act.  
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Insider trading in relation to interests in other entities, including government and 
semi-government stock, was therefore not expressly prohibited.92 However, the 
Minister could on the advice of the Securities Regulation Panel and by notice in the 
Government Gazette exempt certain classes of persons from the insider trading 
provisions.93  
The provisions of the Second Companies Amendment Act were targeted inter alia at 
correcting the shortcomings of the Companies Amendment Act. This was 
enumerated in the Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Second 
Amendment Bill of 1990.94 Therefore, any person who knowingly dealt directly or 
indirectly in a security on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive information95 in 
respect of that security would be guilty of an offence if he knew that such 
information had been obtained:  
(a) by virtue of a relationship of trust or any contractual relationship, irrespective 
of whether or not the person concerned was a party to that relationship; or  
(b) through espionage, theft, bribery, fraud, misrepresentation or any other 
wrongful method, irrespective of the nature thereof.96 
This clearly suggested that insiders and their tippees were prohibited from dealing in 
securities on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive information.97 This can be 
regarded as a positive development. 
Moreover, unpublished price-sensitive information was defined as information which:  
                                        
92  Luiz 1990 SA Merc LJ 328.  
93  See s 440F(5) and (6) of the Second Companies Amendment Act. 
94  Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Second Amendment Bill, 1990 [B119-90] (GA). 
See further Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 11. 
95  Information other than financial data that could also lead to insider trading was not considered. 
Examples might include the incompetence and resignation of a company's directors. Such 
information might arguably not be treated as inside information in terms of the Companies Act 
but it might still have a material effect on the price of securities or financial instruments if 
investors withdrew their investments in the company concerned. Generally see Myburgh and 
Davis 2004 http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf 8; also see Van Deventer 
2008 http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf 1-5, for further related analysis. 
96  S 440F(1) of the Second Companies Amendment Act. 
97  Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 12. 
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 related to matters of the internal affairs of a company, or to its operations, assets, 
earning power or involvement as offeror or offeree company in an affected 
transaction; or 
(c) was not generally available to the reasonable investor; or 
(d) would reasonably be expected to materially affect the price of such securities if 
it were generally available.98 
Seemingly, the term "generally available"99 meant available in the sense that such 
steps had been taken, and such time had elapsed, that it could reasonably be 
expected that the information in question should have been known to the reasonable 
investor in the relevant markets.100 
3.3.1  The enforcement of the insider trading prohibition in terms of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 subsequent to the 1990 amendments  
The enforcement of the insider trading ban was now a joint responsibility of the 
Securities Regulation Panel, the Registrar of Companies, and the Department of 
Justice. As indicated earlier,101 the Securities Regulation Panel was responsible for 
investigating and policing insider trading provisions. Its functions included the 
supervision of dealings in securities and exercising control over insider trading. In 
another attempt to improve the enforcement, the Securities Regulation Panel was 
again given powers to subpoena and to further interrogate witnesses and impose an 
obligation on certain persons to disclose to it information relating to their beneficial 
dealing in securities. This was done by requesting companies to disclose all the 
details of the amount of equity securities of which a person was a beneficial 
owner.102 It was also responsible for ensuring that persons who suffered harm due to 
insider trading had a fair platform to lodge their complaints so that they had proper 
                                        
98  S 440F(2) of the Second Companies Amendment Act. 
99  See s 140A(3) of the Companies Act as introduced in terms of the Companies Amendment Act 37 
of 1999; also see explanatory remarks on disclosure requirements in Gen N 724 in GG 18868 of 
8 May 1998. 
100  S 440F(2)(b) of the Second Companies Amendment Act. 
101  See para 3.2.1 above. 
102  S 440B of the Second Companies Amendment Act; also see s 140A(3) introduced in terms of the 
Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999.  
H CHITIMIRA  PER / PELJ 2014(17)3 
952 
access to a civil remedy. Nonetheless, there was no provision for victims to claim 
compensation directly from persons who were convicted of insider trading (private 
rights of action).  
Two presumptions were introduced to assist the enforcement and prosecuting 
authorities in obtaining convictions in matters involving insider trading.103 Firstly, if it 
was proved that the accused, at the time of the alleged dealing, was in possession 
of unpublished price-sensitive information in respect of the relevant securities, it 
would be deemed, unless the contrary was proved, that the accused had knowingly 
dealt in those securities on the basis of such information. Secondly, if it was proved 
that the unpublished price-sensitive information was obtained in a manner as stated 
earlier in the relevant provisions of the Second Companies Amendment Act, the 
accused was deemed to have known that the information had been so obtained, 
unless the accused could prove the contrary.104 
The maximum sentence for insider trading was a fine of R500 000, or imprisonment 
for a period of ten years, or both. In spite of these significant changes, the 
enforcement of insider trading remained problematic in that no person was 
convicted for insider trading under the Second Companies Amendment Act. 
Moreover, the Securities Regulation Panel did not have its own surveillance 
preventative measures to assist in the detection of suspected insider trading 
activities and it further lacked authority to impose additional civil penalties that could 
have increased settlements in civil cases of insider trading.105 Perhaps there was 
insufficient co-operation between the Securities Regulation Panel, the Registrar of 
Companies and the Department of Justice in relation to the enforcement of the 
insider trading prohibition.  
                                        
103  S 440F(3) of the Second Companies Amendment Act. 
104  S 440F(1)(a) or (b) of the Second Companies Amendment Act. 
105  Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 18.  
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3.4  The regulation of insider trading in terms of the Insider Trading Act 
135 of 1998 
A novel regime aimed at resolving the tenacious insider trading problem in South 
Africa was introduced by the Insider Trading Act.106 The Insider Trading Act repealed 
and replaced the relevant provisions of the Companies Act in an effort to broaden 
the scope of the prohibition of insider trading. In addition to treating insider trading 
as a criminal offence, an attempt was made to provide more appropriate civil 
remedies to those who would suffer prejudice as a result of insider trading activities. 
Furthermore, more severe criminal sanctions were introduced and the insider trading 
ban was extended to a wide spectrum of financial instruments other than securities 
of companies.107 The provisions of the Insider Trading Act, relating to enforcement 
and the role of the enforcement authorities are analysed below. This analysis is 
divided into four parts. Firstly, the provisions that relate to the key concepts of the 
insider trading prohibition are briefly discussed. Secondly, the provisions that deal 
with the enforcement of the insider trading sanctions and penalties are examined. 
Thirdly, a closer look is taken at the roles of the enforcement authorities. Lastly, the 
enforcement methods adopted under the Insider Trading Act are discussed. 
3.4.1  The definition of selected key terms and concepts under the Insider Trading 
Act 135 of 1998 
The term "insider" was defined as an individual who has inside information through 
being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities or financial 
instruments to which the inside information relates or who has access to such 
information by virtue of his employment, office or profession, or who knew that the 
direct or indirect source of the inside information was a director, employee or 
shareholder as contemplated in the Insider Trading Act.108 Two categories of insiders 
were therefore contemplated under the Insider Trading Act. Firstly, there were 
primary insiders such as the directors, employees or shareholders of an issuer of 
securities or financial instruments to which the inside information related, and which 
                                        
106  Benade et al Entrepreneurial Law 130. 
107  Osode 2000 J Afr L 239-248. 
108  S 1 of the Insider Trading Act. 
H CHITIMIRA  PER / PELJ 2014(17)3 
954 
might include fortuitous insiders or individuals who had access to the inside 
information by virtue of their employment, office or profession but who were not 
officers or employees of the company itself.109 Secondly, there were secondary 
insiders or tippees, being individuals who know that the direct or indirect source of 
their inside information was a primary insider.  
The focus in the definition on individuals as insiders clearly implied the exclusion of 
juristic persons. In this context the scope of the definition was too limited.110 
Individuals could easily involve themselves in insider trading activities through 
juristic persons under their control without their entities or companies incurring any 
liability. The exclusion of companies and other juristic persons from the definition of 
an "insider" can therefore be regarded as a serious flaw that was contained in the 
Insider Trading Act and a major compromise on the part of the legislature.  
Inside information was defined as specific or precise information which had not been 
made public and which was obtained or learned by an individual as an insider and 
which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a material effect on the price 
or value of any securities or financial instruments.111  
Only accurate and factual non-public inside information would fall in the ambit of the 
definition.112 Information therefore had to meet four requirements to qualify as inside 
information in terms of the Insider Trading Act. Firstly, the information was required 
to be factually specific or precise. Inaccurate and any unconfirmed information, 
speculation about whether information might be true, rumours or promises were 
excluded. Trading on the basis of rumours or speculation about the value of 
securities or financial instruments could, however, still occur and harm ignorant 
outsiders. The terms "specific" or "precise" were not defined and it was left to the 
courts to determine what would constitute specific or precise information. Although 
it can be assumed that all persons should have a broad understanding of the general 
                                        
109  In this regard, the pool of individuals who could become insiders was now large and included not 
only directors, employees and advisors but also many others, like advertising and production 
professionals engaged to compile and publish inside information for printing.  
110  Osode 2000 J Afr L 239-248; generally see Jooste 2006 SALJ 438-441. 
111  S 1 of the Insider Trading Act. 
112  Osode 2000 J Afr L 248. 
H CHITIMIRA  PER / PELJ 2014(17)3 
955 
meaning of these terms, everybody might not appreciate the degree of specificity or 
precision required for information to qualify. This obscurity could have offered other 
persons an opportunity to engage in insider trading practices without incurring 
liability. This flaw remained unresolved in the Securities Services Act, the Draft 
Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and finally, in the Financial 
Markets Act.113 
 Secondly, the inside information must have been information which was obtained 
only from an insider. Instances where the information originated from sources other 
than the insiders were, therefore, not expressly included in the definition. This 
exclusion might also have left room for abuse. Whatever the situation, the fact 
remains that price-sensitive information that was leaked unintentionally by insiders 
was not covered by the definition and could still be used by other persons to indulge 
in insider trading activities. This position was unfortunately retained in the Securities 
Services Act, the Draft Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and the 
Financial Markets Act.114 
Thirdly, the information must not have been made public, as superficially stipulated 
in the Insider Trading Act.115 The term "publication" was not statutorily defined, but 
a number of ways in which the non-public inside information was deemed to have 
been published were enumerated.116 Lastly, the non-public inside information was 
required to be likely to have a material effect on the price or value of the securities117 
or financial instruments118 after having been made public. The term "material effect" 
was not defined. Moreover, although some of the elements of the insider trading 
offence were described, the concept of "insider trading" was not statutorily and 
expressly defined under the Insider Trading Act. It could be argued that the failure 
                                        
113  See ss 72 and 73 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 81 and 82 of the Draft Financial 
Markets Bill; clauses 79 and 80 of the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and ss 77 and 78 of the 
Financial Markets Act.  
114  See ss 72 and 73 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 81 and 82 of the Draft Financial 
Markets Bill; clauses 79 and 80 of the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and ss 77 and 78 of the 
Financial Markets Act.  
115  S 3 of the Insider Trading Act. 
116  S 3 of the Insider Trading Act. 
117  See the definition in s 1 of the Insider Trading Act. 
118  See the definition in s 1 of the Insider Trading Act. 
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of the Act to provide adequate definitions of these and other terms contributed to 
the inconsistent enforcement of its provisions. Conspicuously, this flaw has 
subsequently remained unresolved in the Securities Services Act, the Draft Financial 
Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and the Financial Markets Act.119 
3.4.2  The selected key elements of the insider trading offence under the Insider 
Trading Act 135 of 1998 
Actual dealing in securities or financial instruments for making a profit or avoiding a 
loss for oneself as well as for any other person was prohibited.120 Individuals were 
liable only if they knew that they had inside information. Therefore, knowledge was 
a prerequisite for criminal liability under the Insider Trading Act.121 Consequently, it 
was very difficult for the prosecuting authorities to prove beyond reasonable doubt 
that the accused was aware that he was in possession of inside information.122 
Seemingly, circumstantial evidence would not suffice for the purposes of the insider 
trading offence under the Insider Trading Act.123 This might explain why very little or 
no success was achieved in the enforcement of the criminal sanctions under the 
Insider Trading Act.124  
Encouraging or discouraging (tipping) another person to deal in or from dealing in 
securities or financial instruments was prohibited.125 Nonetheless, what constituted 
illegal conduct or tipping on the part of the insider was not distinctly and expressly 
stated.126 Apparently, it was immaterial for the purpose of incurring liability whether 
                                        
119  See ss 72 and 73 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 81 and 82 of the Draft Financial 
Markets Bill; clauses 79 and 80 of the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and ss 77 and 78 of the 
Financial Markets Act.  
120  S 2(1)(a) of the Insider Trading Act. 
121  S 2(1)(a) of the Insider Trading Act. 
122  Chanetsa Business Report (page number unknown). 
123  Osode 2000 J Afr L 248 for a generally related discussion. 
124  During the period between January 1999 and January 2002, 28 cases of insider trading were 
investigated. Only 22 cases were successfully settled for civil penalties and no convictions were 
obtained in the other six criminal cases. This information was obtained from an interview that 
was conducted at the Financial Services Board by the author, with Mr Gerhard van Deventer (the 
Executive Director of the Directorate of Market Abuse or the DMA) on 5 May 2009.  
125  This prohibition was aimed at discouraging persons who were privy to non-public price-sensitive 
information to incite others to deal in or to refrain from dealing in securities or financial 
instruments to the detriment of innocent (outside) investors who were at an informational 
disadvantage. See further s 2(1)(b) of the Insider Trading Act. 
126  S 2(1)(b) of the Insider Trading Act. 
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the tippee had actually acted on the tip or whether the insider involved had made a 
profit or avoided a loss.  
The improper disclosure of non-public price-sensitive information was further 
outlawed.127 The use of the term "individual"128 once again implied the exclusion of 
juristic persons and a natural person could be guilty of the offence only if he was 
fully aware that he was in possession of inside information and failed to prove any of 
the defences that were provided.129 Ostensibly, mere disclosure of information by a 
person who knew that it was inside information was sufficient to constitute an 
offence in terms of the Insider Trading Act, irrespective of whether it was acted 
upon or not. However, the prohibition did not extend to innocent disclosure by an 
individual who was ignorant of the fact that the information had not yet been made 
public. For example, an uneducated individual who was simply employed to clean up 
the company's offices (a cleaner in a company), who overheard the directors 
celebrating the company's good financial results while performing his duties and 
later innocently and ignorantly disclosed that information to his friend who then 
purchased shares on the basis thereof, could not be convicted under the Insider 
Trading Act.130 
Civil liability could be incurred by any person who unlawfully dealt in securities or 
financial instruments for his own account.131 Such a person could be ordered to pay 
to the Financial Services Board an amount as provided for in the civil provisions of 
the Insider Trading Act.132 This enabled the Financial Services Board to assist 
prejudiced persons to be compensated by individuals who practised insider trading 
for their own benefit. Nevertheless, the onus of proof was on the Financial Services 
Board to prove on a balance of probabilities that the defendant knowingly dealt 
                                        
127  S 2(2) of the Insider Trading Act. 
128  S 2(2) of the Insider Trading Act. 
129  S 4(2) of the Insider Trading Act. 
130  S 5 of the Insider Trading Act. 
131  S 6(1)(a) of the Insider Trading Act.  
132  S 6(4) of the Insider Trading Act. 
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directly or indirectly in the affected securities or financial instruments for his own 
account.133  
Any individual who knew that he had inside information and dealt in the affected 
securities or financial instruments to gain a profit or avoid a loss through such 
dealing134 could be ordered to pay to the Financial Services Board an amount as 
provided for in the relevant provisions of the Insider Trading Act.135 In addition, civil 
penalties for the improper disclosure of price-sensitive information could be imposed 
on an individual who knowingly disclosed that information to other persons136 and 
failed to prove on a balance of probabilities any one of the stipulated defences or 
any other defence available to him.137 Civil liability for encouraging or causing 
another person to deal in securities or financial instruments was further provided 
under the Insider Trading Act.138 Furthermore, civil liability could be incurred by any 
person who dealt in securities or financial instruments for another person's 
account.139 Accordingly, any person who entered into any unlawful dealing on behalf 
of any other person could, therefore, incur civil liability jointly and severally with that 
person, irrespective of their relationship.140  
3.4.3  The enforcement of the insider trading prohibition under the Insider Trading 
Act 135 of 1998 
The contravention of the provisions of the Insider Trading Act attracted criminal and 
civil sanctions.141 Likewise, the Financial Services Board, courts, the Insider Trading 
Directorate and the Directorate of Public Prosecutions were entrusted with 
responsibility to jointly enforce these provisions.142 The Financial Services Board was 
                                        
133  S 6(1)(a) of the Insider Trading Act. 
134  S 6(1)(b) of the Insider Trading Act. 
135  S 6(4)(a) of the Insider Trading Act. Also see Van Deventer 1999 FSB Bulletin 3 for further 
discussion on the role of the Financial Services Board. 
136  S 6(2)(a) of the Insider Trading Act. 
137  S 6(4)(a) of the Insider Trading Act. 
138  S 6(2)(b) of the Insider Trading Act. 
139  S 6(2)(c) of the Insider Trading Act. 
140  S 6(2)(c) of the Insider Trading Act. 
141  Ss 2 and 6 of the Insider Trading Act. 
142  Generally see Osode 2000 J Afr L 239-248. 
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given wide powers to monitor and enforce the insider trading prohibition.143 In 
addition, the Insider Trading Directorate was, as a committee of the Financial 
Services Board, responsible for exercising all the powers of the Financial Services 
Board.144 It also had powers to decide whether to take civil action or to refer criminal 
matters to the Directorate of Public Prosecutions or the courts. The Insider Trading 
Directorate could also institute a prosecution when the Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions or the Attorney-General neglected to prosecute any alleged insider 
trading case.145 The Insider Trading Directorate was further entitled to withdraw, 
abandon or compromise any civil proceedings in terms of the Insider Trading Act.146 
The capacity of the Insider Trading Directorate was nevertheless limited, and it 
relied heavily on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited's147 Surveillance 
Department for the tracking and detection of insider trading activities. Notably, a 
similar flaw was retained in the Securities Services Act, the Draft Financial Markets 
Bill, the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and the Financial Markets Act.148 
Individuals convicted of any insider trading offence could be sentenced to pay the 
Financial Services Board a fine not exceeding R2 million, or to imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding ten years, or both such a fine and such imprisonment.149 Be 
that as it may, the enforcement of the provisions of the Insider Trading Act was still 
difficult in that only a few civil settlements and criminal convictions were successfully 
obtained.150 The R2 million fine and the ten years term of imprisonment were yet 
again not sufficient to deter persons from getting involved in insider trading 
activities.151 Furthermore, the Directorate of Public Prosecutions did not have the 
                                        
143  Ss 11(1) and (2)(a) to (i) and subsections (3)-(11) of the Insider Trading Act. 
144  S 12 of the Insider Trading Act. 
145  S 11(10) of the Insider Trading Act. Also see Luiz 1999 SA Merc LJ 145.  
146  Ss 6, 12(13) and (14) of the Insider Trading Act.  
147  Hereinafter referred to as the JSE. 
148  S 83 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 92 of the Draft Financial Markets Bill; clause 
87 of the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and s 85 of the Financial Markets Act.  
149  S 5 read with ss 2 and 6 of the Insider Trading Act. 
150  In relation to this, generally see Osode 2000 J Afr L 239-248; Luiz 1999 SA Merc LJ 139-145; 
Loubser 2006 http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf 18-20, 24-27; Blincoe 2001 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/05/23/datatec_directors_pay_up/, where two Datatec 
directors, Jens Montanana and Robin Rindel were reportedly fined about R1 million each for 
insider trading by the Financial Services Board. Also see Jooste 2000 SALJ 284-305 for further 
related analysis. 
151  Van der Lingen 1997 FSB Bulletin 10. 
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capacity to conduct effective and timeous prosecutions. Although the Financial 
Services Board was empowered in terms of the Insider Trading Act to regulate 
insider trading, the prosecuting function was mainly vested in the Directorate of 
Public Prosecutions. The same position was unfortunately retained in the Securities 
Services Act, the Draft Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and the 
Financial Markets Act.152 Besides, the everlasting backlog in our criminal courts might 
also have delayed criminal prosecutions for insider trading and in spite of the fact 
that South Africa was among the first countries to introduce civil remedies,153 the 
flaws in the civil provisions could have undermined the successful enforcement of 
the civil sanctions.154 
3.5  Evaluation of the enforcement of the insider trading prohibition 
prior to 2004 
The pioneering provisions in the Companies Act (including all its amendments) were 
not only inconsistent for the purposes of combating insider trading, but were also 
not properly enforced.155 Notably, the enforcement approaches adopted under the 
Companies Act as amended were few and restricted to criminal sanctions.156 By 
enacting criminal penalties, it appears the legislature relied mainly on the policy goal 
of deterrence, which failed to discourage some persons from practising insider 
trading.157 Other enforcement approaches such as civil sanctions, bounty rewards 
and whistle-blowing were not considered.  
                                        
152  S 82(9) read with s 79 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 91(9) read with clause 81 
of the Draft Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(10) read with clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill, 
2012 and s 84(10) read with s 77 of the Financial Markets Act.  
153  See further Osode 2000 J Afr L 239-248; Luiz 1999 SA Merc LJ 139-145; Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 
4-18.  
154  S 6 of the Insider Trading Act. 
155  See the discussions in paras 3.1.1; 3.2.1 and 3.3.1 above. 
156  Ss 229-233 of the Companies Act; also see s 440F of the Companies Amendment Act; see 
further Barron 2014 http://www.timeslive.co.za/Feeds/2014/02/02/greg-draws-a-blank-in-
belfort-parallel, where Greg Blank was reportedly sentenced to eight years imprisonment for 
stock market-related fraud and front running in 1992. 
157  See the discussions in paras 3.1.1; 3.2.1 and 3.3.1 above. Also see Jooste 1990 De Ratione 21; 
Botha 1990 SALJ 504. 
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As indicated earlier,158 the enforcement bodies established in terms of the Companies 
Act did not achieve much success in the enforcement of the insider trading 
prohibition. In the light of this, the Second Companies Amendment Act officially 
launched the Securities Regulation Panel as an independent body with powers to 
supervise, detect, investigate, and police insider trading in South Africa.159 The 
Second Companies Amendment Act further introduced civil sanctions.160 In spite of 
this, not much success was achieved in terms of the enforcement of criminal and 
civil sanctions of insider trading under the Second Companies Amendment Act. This 
might have been caused by the fact that other enforcement methods such as 
whistle-blowing, bounty rewards and administrative sanctions were still not 
considered.  
The enactment of the Insider Trading Act was therefore welcomed as another 
attempt to enhance the enforcement of the insider trading ban in South Africa. This 
Act introduced considerably higher criminal penalties and more elaborate civil 
remedies. Notably, the Insider Trading Act empowered the Financial Services Board 
to be solely responsible for the policing of insider trading and established the Insider 
Trading Directorate as an investigatory arm of the Financial Services Board. 
Notwithstanding these developments, various gaps and flaws were still embedded in 
the provisions of the Insider Trading Act and these, in a way, impeded the proper 
enforcement of the insider trading ban in South Africa.161 Not giving less regard to 
some key factors like the challenges involving the availability of adequate financial 
resources in South Africa, the Insider Trading Act, like its predecessors, also failed to 
expressly provide for other alternative practical enforcement methods like 
administrative sanctions, whistle-blowing, private rights of action, the establishment 
of additional self-regulatory organs and specific insider trading courts or tribunals to 
complement the enforcement efforts of the Financial Services Board. 
As summarised above, one can probably assert that the general enforcement of the 
insider trading prohibition prior to 2004 was not very successful. The Companies Act 
                                        
158  See the discussions in paras 3.1.1 and 3.2.1 above. 
159  See the discussions in para 3.3.1 above. 
160  S 440F Second Companies Amendment Act. 
161  See para 3.4.3 above. 
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was recently repealed by the Companies Act,162 which inter alia broadly deals with 
the disclosure of relevant information relating to uncertified securities by issuers and 
Central Securities Depository participants in another attempt to combat illicit trading 
practices. For instance, the Companies Act 2008 provides that issuers, companies 
and/or Central Securities Depository participants must timeously record and maintain 
all the relevant details relating to uncertified securities in their securities registers.163 
This Act also states that issuers, companies and/or Central Securities Depository 
participants must have clear guidelines and requirements in place for the inspection 
of such registers164 as well as their own internal audit committees.165 Issuers, 
companies and/or registered shareholders are further required to disclose any of 
their beneficial interests held in respect of their securities.166 Nonetheless, it remains 
to be seen whether or not the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 2008 are 
robust enough to prevent insider trading and market manipulation in South Africa. 
4  Concluding remarks 
It is clear that the various market abuse laws enacted in South Africa were aimed 
mainly at improving the regulation of market manipulation and insider trading in 
order inter alia to restore public investor confidence in our financial markets. Several 
amendments to the market abuse legislation were introduced from time to time in a 
bid to effectively combat market abuse practices in South Africa. Nonetheless, in 
relation to this, it has been shown that both the Stock Exchanges Control Act and 
the Financial Markets Control Act had little success in combating market 
manipulation in South Africa.167 For instance, no express authority was statutorily 
conferred on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange itself to adjudicate and prosecute 
market manipulation cases in South Africa prior to 2004.168 This flaw remained 
unresolved in the Securities Services Act, the Draft Financial Markets Bill, the 
                                        
162  Companies Act 71 of 2008, hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act, 2008. 
163  Ss 50 and 52 of the Companies Act, 2008. 
164  Ss 50 and 52 of the Companies Act, 2008. 
165  S 94(7)(i) of the Companies Act, 2008. 
166  S 56 of the Companies Act, 2008. 
167  See para 2.3 above. 
168  See the related comments in para 2.3 above.  
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Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and the Financial Markets Act.169 In the light of this, it is 
submitted that the policy makers should consider introducing a specific provision into 
the current market abuse legislation that obliges and empowers the JSE's 
Surveillance Division to prosecute or report incidents of market abuse to the 
Financial Services Board. Another option is to financially and statutorily empower the 
Financial Services Board to procure its own market abuse surveillance systems and 
transfer the entire financial markets anti-market abuse surveillance responsibility 
from the JSE to the Financial Services Board. It has been noted that the Stock 
Exchanges Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act did not expressly 
provide for other anti-market abuse methods such as arbitration and alternative 
dispute resolution, whistle-blowing and bounty rewards.170 It has also been stated 
that the pioneering provisions in the Companies Act (including all its amendments) 
were not only inconsistent for the purposes of combating insider trading, but were 
also not properly enforced.171 Notably, the anti-market abuse enforcement methods 
adopted under the Companies Act as amended were few and restricted to criminal 
sanctions only.172 Other anti-market abuse enforcement methods such as whistle-
blowing and bounty rewards were not considered under the Companies Act 
(including all its amendments).173 Amazingly, this flaw was retained in the Securities 
Services Act, the Draft Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and the 
Financial Markets Act.174 In this regard, it is submitted that the policy makers should 
consider enacting additional provisions for anti-market abuse measures such as 
whistle-blowing and bounty rewards into the current market abuse legislation to 
enhance the combating of market abuse in South Africa.  
Eventually the Insider Trading Act was enacted and welcomed as another attempt to 
enhance the enforcement of the insider trading ban in South Africa.175 This Act 
introduced considerably higher criminal penalties and more elaborate civil remedies. 
However, while acknowledging some key factors like the challenges involving the 
                                        
169  See the related comments in para 2.3 above.  
170  See the related comments in para 2.3 above.  
171  See the discussions in paras 3.1.1, 3.2.1, 3.3.1 and 3.5 above. 
172  See para 3.5 above.  
173  See para 3.5 above.  
174  See the related comments in para 2.3 above.  
175  See the related comments in para 3.5 above.  
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availability of adequate financial resources in South Africa, it must be noted that the 
Insider Trading Act, like its predecessors, has failed to expressly provide for other 
alternative practical enforcement methods like administrative sanctions, whistle-
blowing, private rights of action, the establishment of additional self-regulatory 
organs and specific insider trading courts or tribunals to complement the 
enforcement efforts of the Financial Services Board.176 Moreover, the Insider Trading 
Act's failure to provide adequate definitions of some insider trading terms such as 
"material effect", "insider trading", "inside information", "specific" or "precise" and 
"publication" has contributed to the inconsistent enforcement of its provisions.177 
Conspicuously, this flaw was not resolved in the Securities Services Act, the Draft 
Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 and the Financial Markets 
Act.178 Consequently, policy makers should consider enacting adequate definitions of 
these and other related terms to consistently discourage market abuse practices in 
the South African financial markets. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that the 
Financial Services Board was empowered in terms of the Insider Trading Act to 
regulate insider trading, the prosecuting function was vested mainly in the 
Directorate of Public Prosecutions.179 The same position was retained in the 
Securities Services Act, the Draft Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill, 
2012 and the Financial Markets Act.180 It is hoped, given the constant backlog in our 
criminal courts, that additional specialised market abuse courts or tribunals and self-
regulatory organs will be established in future to complement the enforcement 
efforts of the Financial Services Board and enhance the criminal prosecution of 
market abuse cases in South Africa. 
This article has given a historical overview of the regulation of market abuse prior to 
2004 and exposed certain flaws in the previous market abuse laws that have been 
recycled and re-incorporated into the Financial Markets Act's market abuse 
                                        
176  See the related comments in para 3.5 above.  
177  See the related comments in para 3.4.1 above. 
178  See the related comments in para 3.4.1 above.  
179  See the related comments in para 3.4.3 above.  
180  See the related comments in para 3.4.3 above; see further the JSE 2013 
http://www.jse.co.za/Libraries/JSE_Regulatory_Environment_Insider_Trading/InsiderTrading_Bo
oklet.sflb.ashx 1-26. 
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provisions. It is hoped that the recommendations made in this article will be utilised 
by the relevant stakeholders in future to combat market abuse. 
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